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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to explore how classic upstream-downstream conflicts of water 
resources management can be interpreted more broadly in terms of spatial misfits and 
disparities between the river basin, territorial jurisdictions, degrees of political influence and 
socio-economic conditions. It applies the analytical concept of spatial fit in order to explore 
issues of governance in managing water in the Dongjiang River basin, selected by virtue of 
the huge political and economic asymmetries existing between the upstream Jiangxi Province 
and the downstream Pearl River delta region. Using the concept of spatial fit, the paper 
explores the complex environmental, socio-economic and political geographies which frame 
the interdependencies of water use and management within the river basin. It analyses 
attempts by stakeholders at different levels and locations in the basin to advance their own 
water-related interests and the initiatives some are developing to share benefits and costs 
more equitably across the basin. 
Keywords: River basin management; spatial fit; Dongjiang River 
 
1. Introduction  
As any water professional will agree, the task of managing water resources is inherently 
spatial. Given the physical attributes of H2O, its universal prevalence (in the atmosphere, in 
organisms, in watercourses, in aquifers) and its indispensability for all living beings, water 
inevitably has multiple geographies. Managing this vital natural resource involves organising 
the use, distribution, retention and treatment of water between areas of abstraction and use, 
between upstream and downstream communities and between the river and its catchment – to 
name just three of the most problematic spatial dimensions. The geography of water is not 
only multi-faceted, therefore, but also asymmetrical. This results in severe spatial 
externalities, whereby the costs and benefits (economic and otherwise) of managing water are 
spread unevenly and often inequitably. It is little wonder, then, that attempts to improve water 
management have regularly been accompanied by a search for the optimal spatial unit of 
water management.   
Problems of spatial fit are familiar to political scientists, economists and geographers 
interested in determining optimal units of governance for various policy fields, in particular 
relating to the provision of public goods (Young and Underdal 1997, Young 2005, Moss 
2012). For water professionals, the river basin represents the spatial unit most suited to 
overcoming characteristic problems of spatial fit. By managing water resources for a whole 
river basin they hope to address the interdependencies between upstream and downstream 
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effects, water quality and water quantity, and water and land use. Since the 1980s river basin 
management (RBM) has advanced from a scientific concept with isolated applications to a 
global policy paradigm shaping water management across the world (Conca 2006, Molle 
2008, Butterworth et al. 2010). The unitary river basin agency or authority has become, for 
many water professionals, the ideal organizational form for resolving problems of spatial fit 
between the physical geography of water resources and the political territories of 
jurisdictions. In practice, however, RBM often proves difficult to institutionalize. Experience 
from across the globe suggests that RBM may resolve some, but not all, problems of spatial 
fit relating to water and may even generate new problems beyond the water sector (Moss 
2003, Mostert et al. 2007, Huitema et al. 2009). Similarly, the model unitary river basin 
authority is today increasingly subjected to criticism for lacking accountability to democratic 
procedures, compatibility with existing institutional structures and adaptability to address 
cross-sectoral issues (Schlager and Blomquist 2008, Borowski et al. 2008, Huitema et al. 
2009).  
It is against this backdrop of academic debate and practical experience relating to 
problems of spatial fit and RBM that the following paper investigates the case of the 
Dongjiang River (a tributary of the Pearl River) in China. The Dongjiang River Basin is 
characterized by huge spatial asymmetries between the impoverished und under-developed 
upstream communities of Jiangxi Province and the wealth and influence of the downstream 
Pearl River delta cities. The aim of this paper is to explore how classic upstream-downstream 
conflicts of water management and their attempted resolution can be interpreted in terms of 
spatial misfits and disparities between the river basin, territorial jurisdictions, levels of 
political influence and socio-economic conditions. Using the concept of spatial fit, the paper 
explores the complex environmental, socio-economic and political geographies which frame 
the interdependencies of water use and management within the river basin. It analyses 
attempts by stakeholders at different locations in the basin to advance their own water-related 
interests and the initiatives some are developing to share benefits and costs more equitably 
across the basin. As well as using the concept of spatial fit to shed fresh light on the 
geography of water in post-reform China, the paper makes observations from the Dongjiang 
River case on how to incorporate the multiple geographies of water and power asymmetries 
into a more nuanced, but wider-ranging understanding of spatial fit. 
First the paper sets out the case for using the concept of spatial fit to explore water 
governance and RBM, based on a critical review of the literature (section 2). The following 
section presents the Water Allocation Plan for the Dongjiang River basin of 2008 as an 
attempt to address severe spatial asymmetries and misfits of water resources management 
(section 3). This empirical case is subsequently interpreted with respect to issues of spatial fit 
(section 4). A short conclusion summarizes the principal findings and highlights their 
implications for future research on spatial fit (section 5).  
 
2. Problems of spatial fit and river basin governance  
The problem of fit was identified by the Science Plan on Institutional Dimensions of Global 
Environmental Change (IDGEC) in 1999 as one of three clusters of factors which strongly 
shape the performance of institutions that govern human/environment relations (Young 
2005). The basic idea is, in the words of Oran Young, that “the effectiveness of social 
institutions is a function of the match between the characteristics of the institutions 
themselves and the characteristics of the biogeophysical systems with which they interact” 
(Young 2005, p. 57). One obvious dimension concerns spatial fit; that is, the degree to which 
a resource regime matches the spatial scales of the resource or ecosystem it is designed to 
Accepted for publication in the International Journal of River Basin Management 
In print (2014) 
 
 3 
manage (Ekstrom and Young 2009). Examples are fishery conservation regimes which cover 
the migratory pathways of fish and the need for global institutions to deal with climate gas 
emissions. 
The older literature on misfits in human/environment relations – whether spatial or 
otherwise – tended to view this relationship in a somewhat deterministic way. Lee (1993) was 
typical in claiming that the use of resources was likely to be unsustainable when human 
responsibility does not match the spatial, temporal or functional scale of the natural 
phenomena. Similarly, Folke et al. (1998) asserted that spatial mismatches occur where the 
boundaries of management do not coincide with the boundaries of the ecological entity. 
Recent research, whilst advocating the importance of spatial fit, has taken a more reflective, 
nuanced stance, pointing out – for instance – that establishing the bounds of spatial fit is not 
as straightforward as it might appear (Moss 2012). Not every natural resource can be readily 
ascribed a territorial remit. Moreover, if the complex ecosystems on which it is dependent are 
also taken into account – as they should be – then the spatial boundaries can become very 
blurred. In short, there is no simple procedure for determining appropriate system boundaries 
(Young 2005, p. 58).  
Problems of spatial fit are frequently cited as critical factors behind the unsustainable 
management of water resources (e.g. Young 2002, Dietz et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2007). 
Policies or strategies which address only a part of the water system, such as a stretch of a 
river or a point source of pollution, run the serious risk of ignoring, or even creating, negative 
external effects. Orienting water resources management around the river basin, with its 
clearly delineated boundary for surface water, appears to promise the resolution of such 
spatial misfits. Consequently, the ecosystem logic underpinning river basin management is 
today accepted by most hydrologists, water biologists and ecologists, as well as water 
engineers.  
Experiences of institutionalizing river basin management, however, warn against 
overenthusiastic expectations.  Since the late 1980s the literature has, on the basis of 
extensive empirical evidence, challenged the notion of creating perfect spatial fit which 
underlies a purist interpretation of river basin management. Firstly, even in hydrological 
terms, river basin management does not solve all boundary problems. The river basin follows 
surface water, not groundwater, boundaries. These physical boundaries themselves are 
overridden where water supply networks or artificial waterways connect two or more river 
basins. Secondly, river basin management, although improving spatial fit within the water 
sector, often creates new spatial misfits elsewhere (Moss 2003, Horlemann and Dombrowsky 
2012). A river basin authority, covering a different territory to political jurisdictions, will 
generally lack the legitimacy and authority of democratically elected bodies of local, regional 
or central government. It will also experience difficulties in collaborating with policy fields 
not organized around river basins which are nevertheless critical for water policy, such as 
urban development, agriculture, forestry, transportation and energy (Moss 2003, Mostert et 
al. 2007, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007). Thirdly, structuring water management along an eco-
system boundary has often encouraged water managers to focus on biophysical, rather than 
socio-economic, problems of water management. The quest for perfect biophysical fit can 
result in important social and economic factors, such as population trends, regional economic 
development or traditional modes of water use, being overlooked (Huitema et al. 2009).  
The perfect spatial fit, in other words, does not exist. The replacement of existing 
institutional units by organizations oriented around biophysical systems will inevitably create 
new boundary problems and fresh mismatches. However, it would be erroneous to assume, 
on the basis of this criticism, that addressing spatial misfits is not central to water resources 
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management. What is needed are more nuanced and broader understandings of the 
phenomenon of spatial fit as well as less deterministic approaches to resolving spatial fit 
problems. We conclude this section by outlining two novel perspectives on spatial fit and 
RBM which are particularly pertinent to the subsequent case study of the Dongjiang River 
basin. 
Firstly, instead of striving to design the ideal river basin management institution 
capable of maximizing spatial fit we need to consider the territorial unit of the river basin in a 
broader context of overlapping social, economic, political and physical spaces (Lipschutz 
1999). In line with this thinking, research today tends to advocate informal collaboration 
between multiple agencies within a river basin in preference to the creation of a formalized, 
unitary river basin organization as favoured in the past (Schlager and Blomquist 2008, 
Borowski et al. 2008, Butterworth et al. 2010). This requires paying less attention to the 
structure of an authority responsible for managing a river basin and far more to the 
interactions between the multiple organizations affecting water use within a basin.  
Secondly, there is an urgent need to consider the power asymmetries inherent to 
spatial misfits – a seriously under-researched aspect of river basin management. From the 
perspective of an emergent literature highlighting the inherently political and contested nature 
of water resources management (Allan 2003, Zeitoun and Allan 2008, Molle et al. 2008), 
analysis of spatial fit needs to consider the (often overlapping and dynamic) power 
asymmetries between stakeholders. The asymmetrical relationship between upstream and 
downstream communities in managing water resources is just one such example. Others 
spatial dimensions can relate to the politics of scale, position and place (Lebel et al. 2005) or 
the relationship between everyday politics, state water policy, inter-state hydropolitics and 
the global politics of water (Mollinga 2008). Efforts to improve spatial fit, consequently, 
involve reordering power constellations around water and its use, resulting in some actors 
emerging strengthened and others losing influence.  
Before these two new perspectives – on the multiple geographies and the power 
asymmetries of water resources management institutions – are used to interpret the Dongjiang 
River basin case we need to acquaint ourselves first with recent attempts there to manage 
problems of spatial fit through institutional reform and new planning initiatives.  
 
3. The Dongjiang case: managing spatial misfits  
In August 2008 the Guangdong Provincial Government issued a “Plan to Allocate Dongjiang 
River Basin’s Water Resources” (Guangdong Provincial Government 2008). The Plan is 
considered by both researchers and water managers as a significant initiative because it 
includes both water quantity and water quality control objectives. It has been hailed as the 
country’s first such prototype because past attempts to regulate water use by the country’s 
Water Resources Departments focused primarily on one parameter—quantity—and lacked 
effective inter-agency cooperation with the Ministry of Environmental Protection in 
addressing water pollution (Chen and Yue 2008). Of particular relevance for this paper, the 
plan has been branded a promising scheme to merge a river basin-based management model 
with a jurisdiction-based management approach. The underlying belief is that by creating an 
overarching water resources plan and an organization – the new Dongjiang River Basin 
Authority – with a spatial remit which strives to accommodate both the Dongjiang River 
basin and the territory of Guangdong Province, more effective solutions to water 
management problems should be possible. 
Accepted for publication in the International Journal of River Basin Management 
In print (2014) 
 
 5 
With its headwater region located in southern Jiangxi, the Dongjiang River flows 
through the eastern half of Guangdong before it discharges into the Pearl River estuary (see 
Figure 1).  It is a primary source of drinking water for about 35 million people who live in 
Heyuan, Huizhou, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hong Kong (DRB Authority 2007). 
The economies in the upper catchment (Xunwu, Heyuan) are dominated by the agricultural 
sector (see Table 1). Cities located in the middle and lower catchments (Huizhou, Dongguan, 
and Shenzhen) have been characterized by a high degree of concentration of industrial 
production since the 1990s. Both Dongguan and Shenzhen, however, have gradually shifted 
their structure to favour the tertiary sector in the past five years. The economies of 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong, located at the western and southern tips of the river basin 
respectively, are both dominated by the tertiary sector. The populations dependent on the 
Dongjiang’s water thus include those surviving on subsistence-level income in three poor 
rural counties (Xunwu, Anyuan and Dingnan) located in southern Jiangxi, as well as those 
residing in the wealthy cities of Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. In 2010, Xunwu 
reported a per capita GDP of US$1,634, a fraction of Shenzhen’s and Hong Kong’s 
respective figures of US$14,018 and US$30,800 (Table 1).   
 
3.1 Increasing conflicts over water quantity and quality 
The hydrologists’ concerns over the Dongjiang river basin’s long-term sustainability are 
driven and supported by an accumulation of empirical observations made throughout the 
entire river basin. Firstly, in the downstream segment, the rapidly growing industrial and 
population centres extract an increasingly large amount of water from the river system and 
this has, since the 1990s, led to a brewing water shortage problem. The overall water 
abstraction ratio for the Dongjiang was recorded at 35.4% for many years and Guangdong’s 
water research community was alarmed when the ratio shot up to 38.5% in 2004 (He et al. 
2009). In the 1980s it was reported that cities located inside and next to the river basin 
extracted about 4 billion m3 of water from the Dongjiang each year. This figure jumped to 
8.95 billion m3 in 2005 (Southern Metropolis Daily, 17 April 2008).     
Secondly, the looming water shortage problem was compounded by a worsening water 
pollution problem, which has been widely observed and recorded in the Dongjiang river 
basin’s upstream, midstream and downstream sections. In the headwater region, which 
encompasses the territories of the counties of Xunwu, Anyuan and Dingnan inside Jiangxi 
Province and accounts for 13.3% of the Dongjiang’s overall drainage area (see Figure 1), 
waterways leading into the Dongjiang have been found to be heavily polluted. Measurements 
taken by Jiangxi Province’s Hydrological Bureau of eight water quality parameters—
including BOD5, NH3-N, TP and TN—at three water quality monitoring stations during the 
2000-2009 period showed that the overall water quality in the headwater region had 
deteriorated (Zeng 2010). The major causes of deterioration included the wanton discharge of 
wastewater from substandard rare earth mines, the runoff of fertilizer and pesticide 
excessively applied to navel orange orchards and the release of untreated sewage from 
growing urban settlements. 
  While the overall water quality in the Dongjiang’s midstream section has been 
regarded as much better than those monitored in the headwater region, rapid population 
growth in Heyuan and Huizhou, as well as the increased rate of application of fertilizer and 
pesticide to boost productivity in their agricultural sector, has contributed to a mild 
deterioration of the river’s water quality in its mid-segment.  Specifically, measurements 
taken at two water quality monitoring stations—located in Longchuan and Heyuan (marked 
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“A” and “B” respectively in Figure 2)—showed that the values of two key parameters, BOD5 
and NH3-N, had gradually crept up between 2001 and 2007 (Jiang et al. 2009).  
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Figure 1. Dongjiang river basin as defined by hydrologists 
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Table 1. Basic socio-economic characteristics of jurisdictions located inside and adjacent to the Dongjiang River basin 
 
 
Land 
area 
(km2) 
Population Per capita GDP (US$) 
Composition of GDP 
(%) 
 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000d 2005e 2010f 2000 2005 2010 
Upstream 
 Xunwu, Jiangxia 
 Meizhou, 
Guangdongb 
 Heyuan, 
Guangdongb 
 Shaoguan, 
Guangdongb 
 
2,311 
 
15,876 
 
15,642 
 
18,385 
 
287,000 
 
3,805,200 
 
2,267,800 
 
2,736,500 
 
289,000 
 
4,118,400 
 
2,782,400 
 
2,922,600 
 
317,000 
 
4,244,600 
 
2,958,200 
 
2,830,200 
 
313 
 
571 
 
462 
 
849 
 
646 
 
950 
 
927 
 
1,438 
 
1,634 
 
2,191 
 
2,972 
 
3,663 
Agr   Ind   Tert 
45.6  15.1  39.4 
 
31.9  35.9  32.2 
 
37.2  26.5  36.3 
 
24.1  43.6  32.3 
Agr   Ind   Tert 
43.4  18.5  38.2 
 
23.1  41.5  35.4 
 
20.7  39.4  39.9 
 
17.5  42.5  40.0 
Agr   Ind   Tert 
37.9  27.9  34.2 
 
3.9  58.8  37.3 
 
1.3  54.6  44.1 
 
5.4  43.1  51.5 
Midstream 
    Huizhou, 
Guangdongb 
 
11,356 
 
3,218,000 
 
3,706,900 
 
4,601,100 
 
1,676 
 
2,715 
 
5,705 
 
14.8  58.0  27.2 
 
9.3  57.1  33.6 
 
2.3  62.9  34.8 
Downstream 
 Dongguan, 
Guangdongb 
     Guangzhou, 
Guangdongb 
    Shenzhen, 
Guangdongb 
    Hong Kongc 
 
2,472 
 
7,287 
 
1,953 
 
1,104 
 
6,448,400 
 
9,948,000 
 
7,012,400 
 
6,866,000 
 
6,560,700 
 
9,496,800 
 
8,277,500 
 
6,935,900 
 
8,224,800 
 
12,709,600 
 
10,372,000 
 
7,067,800 
 
1,653 
 
3,096 
 
3,963 
 
24,000 
 
4,125 
 
6,668 
 
7,534 
 
25,600 
 
7,835 
 
12,833 
 
14,018 
 
31,800 
 
6.3  54.6  39.1 
 
4.0  43.4  52.6 
 
1.0  52.5  46.5 
  
0.1  14.3  85.6 
 
0.9  56.7  42.4 
 
2.5  39.7  57.8 
 
0.2  53.2  46.6 
 
 0.1   9.2  90.7 
 
0.4  50.9  48.7 
 
1.3  35.4  63.3 
 
0.1  47.2  52.7 
 
0.1  11.4  88.5 
 
 
Sources: 
a   For Xunwu county, the figures for 2000 were taken from Jiangxi Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2001, Jiangxi Statistical Yearbook 2001, Beijing: China Statistical 
Press.  Figures for 2005 were taken from Jiangxi Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2006, Jiangxi Statistical Yearbook 2006, Beijing: China Statistical Press.  Figures 
for 2010 were taken from Jiangxi Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2011, Jiangxi Statistical Yearbook 2011, Beijing: China Statistical Press. 
b  For cities located inside Guangdong Province, the population and per capita GDP figures were taken from Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2011, 
Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2011, Beijing: China Statistical Press.  The composition of GDP figures for 2000 were taken from Guangdong Provincial Bureau 
of Statistics, 2001, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2001, Beijing: China Statistical Press; the 2005 figures were taken from Guangdong Provincial Bureau of 
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Statistics, 2006, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2006, Beijing: China Statistical Press; and the 2010 figures were taken from Guangdong Provincial Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2011, Beijing: China Statistical Press.   
c   For Hong Kong, the figures for 2000 were taken from Hong Kong Year Book 2000, Hong Kong SAR Government, 2001 and Hong Kong Year Book 2001, Hong Kong 
SAR Government, 2002. Figures for 2005 were taken from Hong Kong Year Book 2005, Hong Kong SAR Government, 2006 and Hong Kong Year Book 2006, 
Hong Kong SAR Government, 2007. Figures for 2010 were taken from Hong Kong Year Book 2010, Hong Kong SAR Government, 2011 and Hong Kong Year 
Book 2011, Hong Kong SAR Government, 2012.  
d   Per capita GDP figures for 2000, except for Hong Kong, were converted from RMB into US dollars using the official exchange rate on December 29, 2000 (RMB8.28 
= 1US$). 
e   Per capita GDP figures for 2005, except for Hong Kong, were converted from RMB into US dollars using the official exchange rate on December 31, 2005 (RMB8.07 
= 1US$). 
f   Per capita GDP figures for 2010, except for Hong Kong, were converted from RMB into US dollars using the official exchange rate on December 31, 2010 (RMB6.59 
= 1US$).  
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Figure 2. Jurisdictions covered by Guangdong’s 2008 Water Allocation Plan 
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The water quality in the Dongjiang river basin is worst in the downstream cities of 
Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangzhou. The widespread decline in the Delta’s water quality 
has given rise to inter-city conflict over the questions of who should shoulder the 
responsibilities for cleaning polluted water and how, and where, a city should be permitted to 
gain access to Dongjiang water.  For instance, a persistent cross-boundary water pollution 
problem afflicting the Dongjiang’s downstream river network has become a source of conflict 
between Huizhou and Shenzhen in recent years. Danshuihe, which is a Class-2 tributary of 
the Dongjiang, originates in Shenzhen and drains into Xizhijiang—a Class-1 tributary of the 
Dongjiang—inside Huizhou (Figure 2). Since the late 1990s, uncontrolled discharge of 
untreated industrial and urban wastewater originating from settlements inside Shenzhen has 
polluted Danshuihe and directly contributed to turning the river’s water in Huizhou’s section 
into the lowest classification of Grade V+, meaning that the water is not suitable for use for 
any purpose (He et al. 2009). 
 
3.2 Objectives and control mechanisms 
The formulation of the Water Allocation Plan for the Dongjiang was premised on two major 
considerations.  First, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was accorded top 
priority in the allocation exercise, which simply re-affirmed the fact that the provision of 
Dongjiang water to the former British colony has always assumed national-level political 
importance.  Secondly, in regard to the deployment and utilization of water resources from 
the basin’s three major reservoirs, a new order of priority—flood prevention, municipal water 
supply, then power generation—was introduced.  Power generation, the raison d’etre for 
constructing the reservoirs in the first place, was relegated to a lower priority status.  The re-
arranged order of priority gave recognition to the fact that cities located in the basin’s 
downstream region have assumed greater economic importance than in the past and that they 
are also increasingly dependent on the Dongjiang as the primary source of their municipal 
water supply systems.  
Based on a study of extensive hydrological data pertaining to the river basin, 
Guangdong’s policymakers decided to cap, at 10.66 billion m3 per year, the total amount of 
Dongjiang water that could be safely—ecologically speaking—withdrawn (Chen and Yue 
2008). This amount, equivalent to about 33% of the river’s average annual discharge, was 
argued as a safe margin by hydrologists and ecologists who devised the Plan (Southern 
Metropolis Daily, 17 April 2008). It is based on the calculation that this should ensure a 
regular flow of water in the river so that cities dependent on it for water supply will be able to 
withstand the worst impacts of a prolonged four-year drought period, considered a very rare 
occurrence. Table 2 lists the apportioned figures for eight individual cities.  The overall 
boundary of jurisdictions receiving Dongjiang’s water under the Plan is shown in Figure 1.   
Under the terms of this Plan, city-level officials with water protection duties are 
expected to introduce measures to ensure that the water discharged from their jurisdictions 
would meet two minimal standards stipulated in the Plan—a minimum discharge volume and 
a water quality objective.  To this end, eleven water quality monitoring stations were 
designated by the provincial authorities, covering the entire river basin within Guangdong 
Province (Figure 1). The water quality monitoring results recorded at these stations serve to 
provide the best evidence, as well as leverage, for a downstream jurisdiction to demand 
compliance, on the part of its immediate upstream neighbour, with the Plan’s minimal 
standards. According to the Plan’s operational design, the basin’s overall water quality 
objectives are thus to be achieved through the power of the watchful eyes of a cascade of 
monitors concerned for the welfare of downstream communities. 
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Table 2. The ratio of total allocation to total water consumption  
 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Total allocationa 
(100 million m3/ year) 
Total water 
consumptionb 
(100 million m3/ year) 
Ratio of total allocation to 
total water consumption 
(%) 
Upstream 
   Meizhou* 
 
0.26 
 
22.31 
 
n.a.# 
   Heyuan 17.63 18.04 97.7 
   Shaoguan** 1.22 22.10 n.a.# 
Midstream 
   Huizhou 
 
25.33 
 
21.99 
 
115.2 
Downstream 
   Dongguan 
 
20.95 
 
21.48 
 
97.5 
   Guangzhou*** 13.62 78.32 n.a.# 
   Shenzhen 16.63 17.70 94.0 
   Hong Kong 11.00 9.56c 115.1 
Total            106.64              211.50   n.a.## 
 
Notes: 
n.a.   Not available 
*       The water allocated to Meizhou is supplied to only one of its eight 
administrative divisions—Xingning. 
**     The water allocated to Shaoguan is supplied to only one of its ten 
administrative divisions—Xinfeng. 
***   The water allocated to Guangzhou is supplied to two of its twelve 
administrative divisions—Zengcheng and Guangzhou’s eastern section. 
#           The ratio could not be determined for Meizhou, Shaoguan and Guangzhou 
because the total water consumption figure for each of their concerned 
administrative sub-divisions is not available. 
##      The overall ratio could not be meaningfully determined because of data 
unavailability for Meizhou, Shaoguan and Guangzhou. 
 
Sources: 
a  The total allocation figures were taken from Guangdong Provincial Government, 
2008, “Guangdong Province’s Water Resources Allocation Plan for the 
Dongjiang River Basin” (in Chinese). 
b  The total water consumption figures, except for Hong Kong’s, were taken from 
Guangdong Water Resources Bulletin 2008 (in Chinese), Guangdong: Water 
Resources Department of Guangdong Province.  
c  The total water consumption figure for Hong Kong was taken from Hong Kong 
Year Book 2008, Hong Kong SAR Government, 2009. 
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3.3 Early outcomes 
The Plan has now been implemented for over five years, but no formal evaluative reports 
have yet been released or published by the authorities.  Nevertheless, informal praise has 
been lauded on the project. Guangdong’s Water Resources Department announced in 2011 
that the Dongjiang River Basin Authority, since its creation, had successfully implemented 
water re-deployment plans to counter the drought effects of the dry seasons in the previous 
three years. In addition to such claims to success, some early, and more profound, outcomes 
of the Plan can be discerned in the form of reactions by some of the jurisdictions affected by 
it.  
Firstly, the Plan has proved effective in deliberately under-allotting water resources 
(except for Huizhou and Hong Kong), designed as a contribution to Guangdong Province’s 
overall strategic scheme to achieve province-wide targets for energy saving and emission 
reduction (Chen and Yue 2008). Framed by this strategic perspective, the Plan’s drafters 
believed that the imposition of a permanent limit on the amount of water allowed for each 
city would provide enormous incentives for city officials and enterprises to devise action 
programmes to reduce the use of water and recycle wastewater.  City officials in Dongguan, 
for instance, upon learning that their annual allotted amount was 2.095 billion m3, which was 
about 7.5% lower than their actual annual consumption, immediately proposed a series of 
measures to deal with an expected shortfall in water supply (Duan 2008). 
Secondly, upon the implementation of the Plan, the upstream city of Heyuan 
immediately revived its long-cherished dream of piping and selling Xinfengjiang Reservoir’s 
water directly to the downstream cities of Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangzhou (Xie and 
Huang 2008).  This proposal has been repeatedly rejected by Guangdong’s provincial 
authorities because it was considered by hydrologists and ecologists as extremely damaging 
to the river’s ecology since the scheme would divert up to two billion m3 of the reservoir’s 
water away from the river’s sub-Heyuan section. In an effort to overcome the province’s 
concern, the proponents of this commercial scheme in 2007 re-formulated the project as one 
that focused on building only a potable water supply system. In 2008 and 2009, Heyuan 
reportedly signed memoranda of understanding with Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangzhou to 
serve as the latter’s sole supplier of potable water (Chen and Gan 2008). However, the final 
approval for the project has yet to be granted by Guangdong’s provincial authorities (Liu 
2012). 
Thirdly, in 2010, an engineering proposal, named “West water re-deployed to the 
East”, was presented by some hydrologists as a solution to the looming water shortage 
problem faced by Shenzhen and Dongguan under the restricted provisions of the 2008 Water 
Allocation Plan (Liang 2011).  Specifically, the proponents of this scheme argued that up to 
2.07 billion m3 of water could be diverted from the relatively water-abundant Xijiang (West 
River), a tributary of the Pearl River system located on the western bank of the delta region, 
and channelled through a 95 km aqueduct to supply the thirsty cities located on the delta’s 
eastern bank.  They pointed out that, altogether, the urban economies of Shenzhen, Dongguan 
and Guangzhou—which account for 60% of Guangdong’s total GDP—constituted the 
province’s growth engine. The future development potential of these cities is, however, 
constrained by Guangdong’s “cap and allocate” water plan. Guangdong’s water planners 
have apparently also lent their support to this option because it allows these cities to source 
their water from two rivers rather than one, thereby significantly lowering the urban centres’ 
water supply-related risks. 
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4. Interpreting the case: between multiple geographies and power asymmetries  
On the basis of the above analysis of the problems, objectives and initial impacts surrounding 
recent institutional reform of water resources management in the Dongjiang River basin we 
now explore issues of spatial fit there in more depth. In what ways does the creation of the 
Dongjiang River Basin Authority and Water Allocation Plan represent a novel attempt to 
overcome problems of spatial fit between the hydrological unit of the river basin and 
territorial jurisdictions? What additional socio-economic, political or physical geographies 
have influenced their institutional design and are likely to affect their performance? How 
have power asymmetries within and beyond the river basin helped shape the institutional 
arrangements and who are likely to be the principal winners and losers of the reform?  
To take the first of these three questions, the DRBA and the Water Allocation Plan 
represent, on face value, a highly interesting middle-way between purist river-basin and 
jurisdictional approaches to the spatial organization of water. The spatial domain of the 
DRBA, being a provincial body, is restricted to Guangdong Province, but within the province 
follows the boundary of the Dongjiang River basin (see Figure 1). The Plan covers, in 
addition, areas both beyond the province – notably Hong Kong SAR – as well as beyond the 
river basin in eastern and southern Guangdong. This is partly because the Plan targets water 
allocation issues requiring cross-basin collaboration, but also – interestingly – because of 
competing definitions of the Dongjiang River basin boundary in the delta region. The way in 
which the DRBA is configured to accommodate both river basin and political boundaries is 
greatly facilitated by the fact that 86.7% of the Dongjiang catchment lie inside Guangdong 
Province. In situations where the territory of a river basin is distributed more widely amongst 
various jurisdictions, as in the case of the other two principal tributaries of the Pearl River – 
the Xijiang (West River) and Beijiang (North River) – this model would be far less viable. 
The Dongjiang River Basin Authority (DRBA) works more effectively, in terms of 
accomplishing its stated mandate, than the Xijiang (West River) River Basin Authority 
(XRBA) because the former deals with municipal boundaries that are confined to one single 
province—Guangdong Province.  The mayors of municipalities lying inside Guangdong 
Province answer directly to the Province’s leaders. The DRBA, being an arm of Guangdong’s 
Department of Water Resources, therefore wields much power, on behalf of the provincial 
government, over city-level and county-level officials in regard to water use issues.  By 
contrast, river basin authorities overseeing inter-provincial boundaries are more constrained 
in what they can do to acquire compliance and cooperation from two or more provincial 
authorities because the latter hold a higher bureaucratic rank than the former and they can 
refuse to cooperate with the river basin authorities without any consequences 
In terms of the recent literature on river basin governance, the DRBA is a good 
example of how the authorities have created an institutional arrangement to fit not simply the 
river basin’s topographic boundaries but “its principal problems and its principal 
communities of interest” (Schlager and Blomquist 2008, p. 149). In a way, the creation of the 
DRBA is very much driven by the “politics of position” and the “politics of place” (Lebel et 
al. 2005), where stakeholders located in specific locations within a given area (the river’s 
downstream section inside Guangdong Province) and sharing similar identity, status and 
resources (Guangdong Province’s constituent cities) decided to create a new layer of 
institution to address their shared concerns. In this case, the DRBA is thus organized around 
the “communities of interest” that comprise only those cities that are located inside 
Guangdong Province and are dependent on Dongjiang’s water.  
As this analysis implies, the spatial dimensions surrounding the creation and operation 
of the DRBA reach well beyond the quest to maximize fit between river-basin and 
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jurisdictional territories. The case of the DRBA is illustrative of a number of other important 
geographies at play. One of these is scalar. With the DRBA the Guangdong provincial 
government has created a new mid-level management layer located between the central office 
of the Department of Water Resources at the top of the province’s water management 
hierarchy and the Water Research Bureaus of the cities at the bottom. From this perspective, 
the creation of the DRBA does not represent a radical reordering of water management in the 
province, but rather a sub-provincial institution-building programme designed to strengthen 
the management capacity of the Department of Water Resources. The provincial government 
benefits from the creation of the DRBA firstly by being better able to achieve the economic 
development targets set by the central government and, secondly, by possessing an 
overarching organizational entity capable of dealing with occasional, intense inter-city 
conflicts over water quality problems. In addition, the DRBA can make up for the perceived 
ineffectiveness of the river basin body responsible for the entire Pearl River, the Pearl River 
Water Resources Commission (PRWRC). The PRWRC is one of seven sub-national 
organizations created by the national Ministry of Water Resources to manage inter-
jurisdictional conflicts over water. In practice, the PRWRC, like the other river commissions, 
has long been faulted for being too weak, politically, legally and financially (da Silveira and 
Richards 2013). Its effectiveness in the Dongjiang river basin is further compromized by the 
low priority it accords to the basin’s water management problems and by the fact that its two 
sub-units (water districts) responsible for the basin do not match the basin’s boundary (Figure 
2). From Guangdong’s perspective the PRWRC has failed to pursue the province’s 
grievances against its upstream neighbours over transboundary water pollution problems. In 
terms of the “politics of scale” (Lebel et al. 2005), the creation of the DRBA is therefore an 
expression of the Guangdong provincial government’s reluctance to relinquish power to the 
central government, its frustration at the ineffectiveness of the PRWRC and its unwillingness 
to delegate authority to the municipal water bureaus.  
A further “geography” at play is socio-economic. In a number of ways, the Water 
Allocation Plan reflects emerging socio-spatial trends in the region. The new priority 
accorded to flood protection and municipal water supply over hydroelectric power can be 
read as a response to the growing economic importance of the downstream cities and 
industrial production centres. The Plan’s primary objective—to assure a high degree of 
reliable supply of water to cities throughout DRBA’s jurisdiction—is accomplished not by 
taking water away from hydropower generation and giving it to the cities, but by 
consolidating the power of regulating the water discharge rates of the three main reservoirs in 
the hands of one single agency—the DRBA.  By controlling the timing and the rate of 
discharge of water from the three main reservoirs placed under its jurisdiction the DRBA can 
now determine and control the level of water in the river in a way that assures downstream 
cities of a reliable supply of sufficient fresh water, even in the most unlikely event of a four-
year long drought period. This is also reflected in the Plan’s provisions to improve protection 
of downstream settlements from water pollution via the strategic location of monitoring 
stations on the borders between upstream and downstream jurisdictions. The same motive lies 
behind the measures to secure water supplies for the urban conurbations downstream, 
whether via the top priority water allocation for Hong Kong SAR or the West River water 
transfer scheme for Dongguan and Shenzhen. The city of Heyuan, located in the mid-segment 
of the river basin, is seeking to reap financial benefit from its advantageous geographical 
position by selling drinking water to the wealthy (and thirsty) cities downstream via a direct 
water pipe circumventing the intervening area. All these developments are expressions of a 
“politics of position”, in which the parties involved strive to maximize benefits and minimize 
vulnerabilities dependent on their geographical location in the river basin.  
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This brings us to the third question relating to power asymmetries. In many ways, the 
DRBA and the Water Allocation Plan are the product of power asymmetries in the region. 
What is officially couched in terms of a rational logic to promote river basin management can 
equally be viewed as an attempt by the Guangdong provincial authorities to strengthen their 
own influence vis-à-vis the central government, other provinces and its own local authorities. 
Exploiting the relative weakness of the PRWRC, the provincial government has set up its 
own river basin authority and plan. The DRBA is politically empowered by the provincial 
government to exercise regulatory control over local authorities’ water use – by means of 
strict allocation quotas – in the interest of promoting Guangdong’s overall policy agenda. 
Being limited to Guangdong Province, the DRBA has effectively excluded, and politically 
marginalized, both the upstream Jiangxi Province and downstream Hong Kong SAR from the 
process of formulating the Water Allocation Plan. At the same time, the DRBA’s influence, 
in terms of its command over water allocations, extends beyond the river’s natural boundary 
and reaches parts of Shenzhen and all of Hong Kong SAR. Overall, the likely beneficiaries 
include the provincial water authorities with their additional resources to implement the Plan, 
water users in downstream cities with their guaranteed (if limited) water allocations, as well 
as the privileged Hong Kong SAR, and mid-stream communities with options for water 
trading with downstream cities. Most likely to lose out are Jiangxi Province, for being 
effectively marginalized from the whole exercise, and power generation companies losing 
control over the use and deployment of water from their major reservoirs. In other words, it is 
likely that the operation of the DRBA and the implementation of the Plan may help preserve, 
if not accentuate, the asymmetrical power relationships within and beyond the river basin. 
This supposition is backed by the observation that the poorest administrative unit (Xunwu 
county) and the richest jurisdiction (Hong Kong SAR) have been, and are still being, 
excluded from the plan-making and decision-making processes relating to water allocation in 
the basin. 
At this early stage of implementation there remain many open issues, however, which 
could alter this picture, possibly reducing some of the described asymmetries. For instance, it 
is unclear whether water fees paid by the wealthy downstream cities act as a form of 
compensation to poorer upstream communities and whether such payments could be used to 
reward them for water conservation services, thus improving water quality and incomes 
upstream at the same time. It is also uncertain how the system of compliance to the Plan’s 
stipulations will work in practice. Downstream users can now report instances of non-
compliance to the DRBA. With the hard data that is being collected at the monitoring stations 
the DRBA can pursue established protocols in requiring upstream transgressors to take 
remedial action.  Additionally, the DRBA can take the most contentious cases all the way up 
to the provincial authorities for resolution. How far the authorities will be willing to apply 
these sanction mechanisms in practice remains to be seen.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We conclude this paper by summarizing the principal findings and reflecting on their 
implications for future research on problems of spatial fit in water resources management. 
The case of the Dongjiang River basin resonates in many ways with findings from recent 
research on how best to address problems of spatial fit between hydrological and 
jurisdictional units of governance. The DRBA and the Water Allocation Plan are oriented 
around the river basin, but not exclusively. The DRBA operates only within the boundaries of 
Guangdong Province and the Plan extends to additional areas outside the province dependent 
on water from the Dongjiang. This construction, though spatially imperfect to purists of river 
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basin management, would appear to hold considerable potential to overcome past water 
quality and quantity problems. It has enabled the introduction of water quality monitoring at 
strategic points between key jurisdictions. It has set water allocation quotas for all 
communities dependent on the basin for their water supply, encouraging water conservation 
programmes. It has also created a mid-level organization – the DRBA – in a position to 
regulate intra-basin conflicts over water allocation and use in the absence of adequate 
intervention by the sub-national water commission PRWRC. From this perspective the 
institutional arrangements for the Dongjiang River basin reflect the complex realities and 
particular context of water resources management in the region and are therefore, according 
to the recent literature on river basin governance, likely to be more effective as a result.  
The two other perspectives applied in this paper – on multiple geographies and power 
asymmetries – suggest that other readings are possible which shed a less favourable light on 
the new arrangements. The introduction of socio-economic and political dimensions to the 
equation has revealed the importance of huge spatial disparities between wealthy and 
influential downstream cities and under-developed and weak upstream communities behind 
the design of the Plan, disparities which are unlikely to be redressed – and may even be 
exacerbated – by its implementation. The principal objective of the Plan is to provide the 
downstream industrial and residential centres with guaranteed supplies of water in adequate 
quality. Compensation arrangements for the upstream communities remain, by contrast, 
unclear. The DRBA and Plan strengthen the hand of the provincial government vis-à-vis not 
only its constituent local authorities but also the central government, in the shape of the sub-
national PRWRC.  
Both new perspectives – as applied to the Dongjiang River basin – raise important 
issues for future research. Firstly, they fundamentally challenge the assumption, common in 
the literature on river basin management, that the downstream community is ‘naturally’ in the 
weaker position, owing to its dependence on upstream water use and pollution. This applies 
only if the resource water is the sole point of reference. By broadening the perspective to 
include social, economic and political relationships between upstream and downstream 
communities, the position of each becomes far less clear-cut. The seemingly ‘given’ 
asymmetry in favour of the upstream user can be counteracted by, say, the superior economic 
wealth or political influence of a city at the mouth of a river. Secondly, the quest for 
improved spatial fit for water resources management is shown to be a very political project. 
However well it is framed as a rational step towards integrated, basin-based management, 
power contestations and alliances will inevitably be highly instrumental. An important task 
for future research on spatial fit – as on water resources management in general – is to 
address the (spatial) politics of water not as something peripheral, or even distasteful, but as 
something very real and therefore very significant for understanding and shaping the future of 
water governance.  
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